Read the article below (Appendix 1) by a contemporary historian. Explain in your own words why De Valera may not have attended the negotiations in London. Summarise your points.				
				

2. A) Compare and c	ontrast the Irish Delegation to the British Delegation.
-	
B) Imagine you were a	an impartial advisor at the negotiations; explain what concessions you would have recommended for both sides to

3. Considerations:

Discuss with a classmate; arguments for and arguments against the Treaty from what you have read above. Make a list below:

Arguments for the Treaty:	Arguments against the Treaty:

4. Cloze Test

truce	de Valera	London	Arthur Griffith	plenipotentia	ries Ambushes	
Articles	Free State	dominions	stepping-stone	twenty-six	Cathal Brugha	
September,	accepte	d Lloyd George's inv	vitation to send a team of Ir	sh negotiators to		
rskine Childers		a the delegation wh	ich also included Michael Co	onins, Eamonn Duggar	, Robert Barton and George G	avan Duny
	nembers of Irish deleg		them	rch the members of the	ne British delegation and list	
2 3			1. 2.			
5			4.			
_	•			•	ge's 'threat of terrible and imr would remain within the ei	
erms that gave i	it equality of status wi	ith the other	in the British (ommonwealth.		

The Treaty document revealed the divisions in the philosophy and leadership of Sinn Fein that had been festering	since 1917. On returning to Ireland the
delegates were met with hostile criticism from extreme republican members of the Dáil such as	who viewed the Treaty as a
petrayal of the men and women of 1916.	
Michael Collins, on the other hand, argued "In my opinion [THE TREATY] gives us freedom, not the ultimate fre	eedom that all nations desire and develop
to, but the freedom to achieve it."	
For Eamon de Valera, the Treaty was 'not a, but a barrier in the way to complete independ	ence'. He criticised the delegation for
signing without first consulting the Dáil believing they acted beyond their designated role.	
Dáil Debates: After a series of highly-charged Dáil debates between 14 December 1921 and 7 January 1922, the	parliament of the Irish republic ratified
the Treaty by a slender <u>64–57</u> vote. The Treaty replaced the republic with acounty Irish Free Sta	ate governed by a parliament (later called
the third Dáil).	
Articles of Agreement (Main Points)	

- 1. Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State.
- 2. The Treaty dissolved the Republic declared in 1919 and pledged the Irish TDs in Dail Eireann to swear an oath of allegiance to the British Crown.
- 3. A governor general, the Crown's representative in Ireland, would be appointed.
- 4. A Boundary Commission would be established to determine the border of Northern Ireland (created by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920)
- 5. The British military garrison was to be withdrawn from Ireland and the RIC disbanded.
- 6. The British would retain three naval bases in Ireland. (Cobh, Berehaven, Lough Swilly)

Note: The Government of Ireland Act decided by the British Gov. came into force on May 3rd 1921 as the Anglo-Irish War continued. It partitioned Ireland and created 6 county Northern Irish state.

5. Controversaries – Explain in your own words how the following were contentious.

Controversary	Explain
De Valera remains in Dublin	
Role of Plenipotentiaries	
External Association	

Partition and the Boundary	
Commission	
Oath of Allegiance	
Split in Sinn Fein	

Civil War	

Appendix 1: Truce and Treaty: Why did de Valera not lead the delegation sent to London?

A mistake, cowardice or duplicity – historical opinion is divided.

"This was a team they were sending over and they were leaving their ablest player in reserve." A century later, WT Cosgrave's complaint still has force. Why on earth did <u>Éamon de Valera</u>, the undisputed leader of Irish nationalism, not lead the delegation sent to London to negotiate Ireland's future relationship with Britain?

Historical opinion has largely sided with Cosgrave. De Valera's decision not to go to London is widely seen as, at best, a mistake. At worst, it is blamed on cowardice or duplicity. The argument runs that de Valera knew negotiation meant compromise, and he didn't want to be tainted by it. By refusing to lead the delegation himself, he was setting others up as scapegoats.

Naturally, de Valera rejected this interpretation. But a telling sign that he knew he was on rocky ground was the great lengths he went to in later life to defend his decision. His refusal to go to London was one of the issues, along with his role in the outbreak of the Civil War and his decision to take the oath in order to enter the Dáil in 1927, that he came back to again and again in discussion with colleagues, journalists and historians. On these issues he had, according to historian FSL Lyons, an "obsessive concern to set the record straight as he saw it".

Éamon de Valera, right, the then president of the Irish Republic, with Arthur Griffith, as they arrived in London, July 1921, to attend the Irish Peace Conference.

The arguments for de Valera to lead the delegation appeared compelling. He was the leading figure on the Irish side, so it made sense for him to captain the team if, as expected, British prime minister <u>David Lloyd George</u> led the British side. There was also the point, made by Cosgrave, that he had unrivalled experience as a negotiator, including his July talks with Lloyd George in London after the truce. He was the leader, he knew the ground, therefore he should head the delegation.

But de Valera did have good practical reasons not to go. If the delegates had to refer back to their president on major issues, they could deflect British pressure to come to an immediate agreement. That is why the plenipotentiaries — who were given full powers to negotiate and sign an agreement — were also instructed to refer back to Dublin before doing so. And, if the talks broke down, he could always make a last-minute intervention to save the day.

It was de Valera's intention to be in constant contact with the delegation, "as close almost as if I were in London". And yet, at the crucial point of the talks, he wasn't even in Dublin, deciding instead to visit IRA units in Galway and Limerick. As it happens, the plenipotentiaries didn't try to contact him before signing the Treaty, so his absence made no difference, but the decision nevertheless seems odd.

'Symbol of the Republic'

But quite apart from practicalities, there were more fundamental reasons for de Valera not to go, as he explained to the Dáil in response to Cosgrave. He regarded himself, as president, as the "symbol of the Republic". As such he should be kept in reserve, and "should not be compromised in any sense by any arrangements which it might be necessary for our plenipotentiaries to make".

De Valera knew compromise was inevitable, but didn't want to make those compromises himself. Was this simply cowardice, as his opponents claimed? Or did he have a better reason for refusing to get his hands dirty?

De Valera knew he would have a battle to persuade hardline Republicans, like <u>Cathal Brugha</u> and Austin Stack, to accept a compromise. And he believed he would be in a better position to do so if he wasn't tainted by the "London atmosphere".

And, in fact, he did manage to persuade Brugha to back a potential compromise, thanks to a sophisticated formula of his own invention. His initial talks with Lloyd George in July showed that the British would not accept complete separation from the Crown; he was also well aware that a significant segment of the Dáil, of the Cabinet, and of the IRA, insisted on a Republic outside the Empire.

His hope of squaring this circle rested on his concept of "external association" – an idea which came to him one morning as he tied his shoelaces. <u>Ireland</u> would be outside the Commonwealth, but associated with it. Ever the mathematician, he explained the concept with the aid of a diagram, to the disgust of <u>Michael Collins</u> ('How could one argue with a man who was always drawing lines and circles to explain his position?").

But the idea did its job – at least in Dublin. In a concession de Valera regarded as "priceless", Brugha signed a document in October specifying that as long as other matters were satisfactorily settled, "we are prepared to recommend to our people that the accepted head of Great Britain be recognised as the head of the new association".

Untainted

De Valera felt that as the "symbol of the Republic", untainted by the compromises entailed in negotiations, he had a better chance of keeping Brugha and other hardline Republicans on board with this compromise, and avoiding a disastrous split in Sinn Féin and the IRA. Paradoxically, he believed the best way to ensure a deal was done was for him to stay away from the London talks.

There were just two problems with this strategy. The first was that the British had absolutely zero interest in external association. While Lloyd George had no personal problem with a touch of constructive ambiguity, he had to sell any deal to Tory die-hards who had less supple intellects.

The second problem was that none of the plenipotentiaries fully understood what de Valera had in mind – as <u>Robert Barton</u> recalled, they had "but a hazy conception" of what external association would look like. Had he gone to London, de Valera might not have been able to convince the British, but he could at least have done his idea justice in the negotiations.

De Valera remained stubbornly loyal to the concept of external association; it formed the main differences between the Treaty and the alternative he introduced during the Dáil debates, the so-called Document No 2, even though the hardline republicans it was designed to attract had, by that stage, given up on the idea (and the British still weren't interested). He would eventually put it into practice under the Constitution he introduced in 1937.

But that was the future. To return to 1921, there may have been strong tactical and strategic reasons for de Valera not to go to London. But in the end, those reasons were trumped by the disadvantages caused by his absence. Cosgrave was right; the "ablest player" should not have been left in reserve.

David McCullagh is an author and RTÉ journalist